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APPEALABILITY OF DENIALS OF MOTIONS TO
IMPLEAD AND RELATED DISCRETIONARY
ORDERS IN MARYLAND
Northwestern National Insurance Co. v.
Samuel R. Rosoif, Ltd.'
Certain homeowners, having suffered explosion damage
to their premises, brought contract actions against their
insurance companies to collect on their policies. The appel-
lants, two of such insurance companies, filed motions to
implead the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, etc. and
Samuel R. Rosoff, Ltd., a corporation, contending that the
latter caused the damage complained of by its blasting
operations in connection with the building of a water tunnel
for the City of Baltimore. The motions were granted and
the City and Corporation were made third-party defen-
dants. Thereafter motions were filed by the impleaded
parties to strike out the orders impleading them. From the
granting of orders striking the impleading orders, the
insurance companies appealed.
The appellees, the City and Corporation, moved to dis-
miss the appeals contending: (1) that the appeals were
prematurely taken, for the orders had dismissed the third-
party complaints without prejudice and were therefore not
final, as they did not deny the appellants the means of
further prosecuting their claim, if any, against the appel-
lees; (2) that the right to implead is not absolute but is
within the discretion of the trial court and hence no rights
were denied, and therefore no direct appeal could be taken;
(3) that even if the orders were appealable, there was no
abuse of discretion and hence the orders dismissing the
third-party complaints should not be reversed.
The appellants, on the other hand, contended that the
orders were final and appealable, and if they were held
liable to the homeowners, they would become subrogated
to the latter's rights against the City and Corporation.
Therefore, they claimed, the question of who is ultimately
to pay the damages could be and should be settled in
one suit. They also contended that if the impleading were
not allowed, the statute of limitations might run to bar
any action by them against the appellees before their
liability to the homeowners had been settled in the present
suit.
173 A. 2d 461 (Md. 1950).
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The Court of Appeals held that the orders striking the
impleading orders were final and hence appealable, but
they upheld the action of the lower court in striking said
orders, saying that there was no abuse of discretion.
Prior to 1948, the only third-party practice in Maryland
was that which existed under General Equity Rule 282 and
under Section 27 of Article 50,3 said section being a section
of the Joint Tort-feasors Act4 which was adopted in 1941.
These provisions were superseded in 1948 when Part Two,
III, Rule 4 of the General Rules of Practice and Procedure
became effective. This present Maryland Third-Party
Practice Rule is based on and is similar to Federal Rule 14,6
the Federal Third-Party Practice Rule, as amended in 1946.
The purposes of this rule are to save time and the duplica-
tion of evidence by deciding in one suit what would other-
wise require two suits, and thus also to obtain consistent
results from identical or similar evidence, and to avoid the
handicap to the defendant of a time difference between
the judgment against him and a judgment in his favor
against the third-party defendant.
Section (a) of Rule 4 states:
"Where the defendant in any action claims that a
person not a party to the action is or may be liable
to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against
him, he may move for leave to serve a summons and
claim upon such person as a third party. The motion
may be made ex parte before the action is at issue,
and thereafter on notice to the plaintiff . .
Section (b) states:
"If the court in its discretion grants the motion, the
defendant shall cause a summons and copies of the
2 Md. Code (1939), Art. 16, Sec. 202.
2 Md. Code Supp. (1947).
'Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 50, Secs. 21-30.
8 The practice of impleading third parties springs from the old practice of
vouching in a party. It does not supplant this former practice, but rather
is supplementary to it and more extensive, in that it decides in one action
what formerly took two actions. In 1873 impleader practice was introduced
in England under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, ch. 66, par. 24(3),
and as early as 1883 it was sanctioned in American Admiralty Practice; of.
The Hudson, 15 F. 162 (1883).
'Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - Rule 14(a). Rule 14 was adopted
in 1937, and was amended to its present form in 1946. It allows the defen-
dant to move to implead a person not a party to the action who is or may
be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him.
7 Md. Code Supp. (1947) - General Rules of Practice and Procedure,
Part Two, III, Rule 4, Sec. (a).
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third-party claim and the previous pleadings to be
served on the third party...,,
Thus the granting or denying of the motion to implead is
expressly declared to be within the discretion of the trial
court.9
It is well settled in this state that a final order is one
which finally settles some right of the parties or denies to
a party the means of further prosecuting or defending his
suit.10 As a general rule, the Court of Appeals has con-
sistently held that discretionary orders of the lower court
are not final orders and hence are not directly appealable."
The annotations to the Maryland Code enumerate some
nineteen discretionary orders from which no appeal will
lie 2 and Mr. Poe in his work on Pleading and Practice cites
twenty-six such orders.'
The rule of non appealability of discretionary orders
follows from the fact that a discretionary order settles no
absolute rights of the parties, for, where the granting or
denying of a motion is left to the discretion of the judge,
neither party could have a right to have such motion
granted or denied. 4 As Mr. Bowers in his work on Judicial
Discretion says:
"Judicial discretion is the option which the judge
may exercise between the doing and the not doing of a
8 Ibid, Sec. (b).
'This is in accord with the Federal Practice, General Taxicab Assn. v.
O'Shea, 109 F. 2d 671 (D. 0. 1940) ; the English Practice, Anno. Prac. (1946-
47) 313; the New York Practice, New York Judicial Council, Twelfth Annual
Report (1946) 199-201; the Missouri Practice, Laws Mo. 1943, par. 20, p.
362; and the Wisconsin Practice, Wis. Stat. (1945), par. 260.19, 260.20.
"Boteler v. State, 7 Gill & J. 109 (1835); Welch v. Davis, 7 Gill 364
(1848) ; Hazelhurst v. Morris, 28 Md. 67 (1868) ; Gittings v. State, 33 Md.
458 (1871) ; In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 125 A. 177 (1924) ; Adams v.
GiUespie, 151 Md. 52, 133 A. 831 (1926) ; Purdum v. Lilly, 182 Md. 612, 35 A.
2d 805 (1944) ; 2 Po, PLrADING AND PRACTICE (Tiff. ed. 1925), Sec. 826, pp.
800-801; Mnizu, EQUITY PnocEnURo, Sec. 305, p. 376.
uWall v. Wall, 2 Har. & Gill 79 (1827) ; Warren v. Twilley, 10 Md. 39
(1856) ; Bell v. Jones, 10 Md. 322 (1856) ; Bannon v. Warfield, 42 Md. 22,
39 (1875) ; Zimmer v. Miller, 64 Md. 296, 1 A. 858 (1885) ; Gottschalk v.
Mercantile Trust and Deposit Co., 102 Md. 521, 62 A. 810 (1906) ; Tidewater-
Portland Cement Co. v. State, 122 Md. 96, 89 A. 327 (1913) ; PoE, op. cit.,
supra, n. 10, Sec. 287; MrI.Es, op. cit., supra, n. 10, Sec. 314, p. 385.
2 Md. Code (1939), Art. 5, Sec. 2.
Po, op. cit., supra, n. 10, Sec. 827.
"On this point the Minnesota Supreme Court in Chapman v. Dorsey, 230
Minn. 279, 41 N. W. 2d 438 (1950), 16 A. L. R. 2d 1015, said, 'The very
existence of this discretionary power negatives any assumption that a posi-
tive legal right is involved .... " The court then went on to hold that "an
order denying a motion to bring in additional parties is not appealable, in
that it does not involve the merits of the action or some part thereof'."
(Italics supplied.)
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
thing, the doing of which cannot be demanded as an
absolute right of the party asking it to be done"."
Some discretionary orders however, are made directly
appealable by statute and such is the case, for example,
with injunctions in equity, the granting or denying of
which, though discretionary with the judge, is immediately
appealable. 16
In the absence of statute, since a discretionary order
affects no rights of the parties, it would seem that a dis-
cretionary order should only be appealable where it denies
to a party the means of further prosecuting or defending
his suit. An illustrative case is Purdum v. Lilly," in which
case plaintiff's petition for an examination of an alleged
lunatic under Discovery Rule 5, Part II of the General
Rules of Practice and Procedure of 1941, was dismissed by
the lower court. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals, after
holding that the application for examination was addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial court which would not
be interfered with unless such discretion was manifestly
abused, went on to say:
".... it is now a well settled principle that the ruling
of the court below, must in order to form the proper
basis for an appeal be so far final as to determine
and conclude the rights involved in the action, or to
deny to the party who seeks redress by an appeal, 'the
means of further prosecuting or defending the suit' in
the court of original jurisdiction". 8
The Court, however, proceeded to hold this order appeal-
able saying:
"While we must not be understood as countenancing
an appeal from every order construing the General
Rules of Practice and Procedure, adopted in 1941, we
do feel that from the very nature of the issue involved
in the instant case the denial to the appellant of the
privilege of having an examination of the alleged
incompetent made by disinterested physicians prior
to the sanity hearing before the sheriff's jury was
tantamount to the denial to her of 'the means of
further prosecuting the suit' presented by her original
petition".19
15BowERs, JUDICIAL DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURTS (1931), par. 12, 20.1 8 MILLER, Op. cit., supra, n. 10, Sec. 311, p. 390.
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In Tidewater Portland Cement Co. v. State,2o the Court
of Appeals said that in criminal cases with a death penalty,
the defendant has an absolute right of removal and hence
a refusal to allow removal would be a final order and
immediately appealable, but in criminal cases without a
death penalty, whether or not the defendant can have his
case removed to another court is discretionary with the
judge so that:
"... an order in such cases, refusing the application
of removal is not to be regarded in the nature of a
final order from which an immediate appeal will lie,
but as in the case of like rulings on demurrers and
other interlocutory judgments, no appeal lies there-
from until final judgment".2 1
In Gottschalk v. Mercantile Trust and Deposit Co., the
Court said:
"It is not necessary at this late date to cite author-
ities in support of the well settled doctrine that an
appeal will not lie from an order or decree passed in
the exercise of an undoubted discretion of the lower
Court".22
Too numerous to cite are the Maryland cases holding
that matters resting in the discretion of the lower court
are not reviewable on appeal, and it goes without saying,
that if they cannot be reviewed on appeal from a final judg-
ment, then certainly they do not admit of immediate
appeals. Most of the later cases, however, now recognize
that discretionary orders may be reviewed where there
has been an abuse.23 In every case in which the Court of
Appeals has held that there was no abuse of discretion,
however, the court, to so hold, must first have reviewed
the discretion, hence the court does in fact review discre-
tionary orders even where there is no abuse. Thus the
phrase, "not reviewable unless there has been an abuse",
which is so often used by the Court in dismissing from its
consideration matters in which it has found no abuse, is
- 122 Md. 96, 89 A. 327 (1913).
Ibid, 100.
- 102 Md. 521, 522, 62 A. 810 (1906).
Skirven v. Skirven, 154 Md. 267, 273, 140 A. 205 (1928) ; Buckner v.
Jones, 157 Md. 239, 145 A. 550 (1929) ; Dougherty v. Dougherty, 187 Md. 21,
48 A- 2d 451 (1946) ; Taylor v. State, 187 Md. 306, 49 A. 2d 787 (1946) ;
Jones v. State, 188 Md. 263, 52 A. 2d 484 (1947) ; Naughton v. Paul Jones
& Co., 190 Md. 599, 59 A. 2d 496 (1948).
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incorrect and misleading. It would seem that what the
Court should say is that the discretionary order will not
be disturbed or reversed unless there has been an abuse.
In the instant case, before ruling on the question of
whether or not there had been an abuse, the Court of
Appeals, after citing the fact that the motion to implead
was within the discretion of the trial court, said:
"That does not necessarily mean, however, that
where the action of the lower court is clearly arbitrary
or has no sound basis in law or in reason, it could not
be reviewed, but it does mean that we will not reverse
the judgment of the trial court, unless there is grave
reason for doing so".24 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the Court here used the correct phrase and this
sentence was cited with approval by the Court of Appeals
in the subsequent case of Day v. State,25 in which the Court,
on appeal from a final judgment, reversed a conviction for
murder because the judge abused his discretion in denying
a motion to sever.
Though in fact appellate courts now review discretion-
ary matters, the tendency in recent times has been not
to enter upon such a review unless an abuse of discretion
has been alleged by the appellant. However, reviewing a
discretionary matter when an appeal has been taken from
a final judgment is far different from allowing an immediate
appeal from such an order, and the fact that an abuse of
discretion has been alleged should not be sufficient reason
for allowing an immediate appeal. In every case the judge
must make several discretionary rulings, and if a party
could appeal from each one, just by alleging an abuse, it
would open up a wide avenue for repeated delays and
would certainly tie up the already overcrowded docket of
the Court of Appeals.
The Maryland cases substantiate this view. In Snyder
v. Cearfoss the Court said:
"The fact that a ruling complained of may, under
certain circumstances be reviewable on the ground of
abuse of discretion, does not make it reviewable
forthwith"."
Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Samuel R. Rosoff, Ltd., 73 A.
2d 461, 466 (Md. 1950).
76A. 2d 729, 731 (Md. 1950).
"186 Md. 360,366, 46 A. 2d 607 (1946).
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In State v. Haas," the Court held that an application for
leave to examine a confession, alleged to have been made,
should be left to the discretion of the trial court, which
discretion was subject to review if abused. However, the
Court went on to say that no method is now provided that
such a review can be had before trial.28
Although no previous Maryland case has ever deter-
mined whether or not the striking out of an impleading
order is appealable, there have been two cases on the
appealability of discovery orders under Part Two, II, Rule
4 of the General Rules of Practice and Procedure.
In Halman v. Gross,29 the Court of Appeals dismissed
an appeal from an order granting discovery saying that
there was nothing final in the proceeding and that rulings
on questions whether or not the matter produced by dis-
covery process was pertinent and material and not priv-
ileged, would be considered by the reviewing court only
on appeal from a final decree. The other case is the earlier
one of Eastern States Corp. v. Eisler,30 which, though it
allowed an appeal from an order granting discovery, is not
contrary to Hallman v. Gross.1 In this case the defendant
demurred to the complaint and the plaintiff sought dis-
covery before issue was joined by an answer. The Court
of Appeals said that by filing the demurrer the defendant
had questioned the jurisdiction of the court and until the
demurrer was ruled on, it was questionable whether the
passage of the order was within the discretion of the court.
The Court of Appeals then went on to quote from Gott-
schalk v. Mercantile Trust Co., in which the Court, after
saying that discretionary orders were not appealable, said:
"The question whether the subject-matter of the
order or decree was within the area of the discretion
of the Court which passed it, is open to examination
upon an appeal in the same case, for a Court cannot
improvidently extend the exercise of its discretion to
matters which lie beyond its legitimate reach".32
The Court of Appeals, in the Eisler case: also said that
the Maryland Discovery Rule was patterned after Rule 34
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and there being
- 188 Md. 63, 76, 51 A. 2d 647 (1947).
z' Ibid.
,190 Md. 563, 59 A. 2d 304 (1948).
181 Md. 526, 30 A. 2d 867 (1943).
Supra, n. 29.
Supra, n. 22, 522
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no Maryland case explaining the Rule, it would look to
the Federal Courts for interpretation.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals recognized that
no previous Maryland case had ever determined whether
or not the striking out of an impleading order was immedi-
ately appealable. It likewise recognized that the Maryland
Third-Party Practice is similar to Federal Rule 14. How-
ever, the Court refused to follow the Federal case of
Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co.,83
which directly held that the dismissal of an impleading
order was not a final order and hence, not appealable.
Instead, the Court of Appeals chose to follow two Maryland
cases 34 and four other Federal cases 35 in which a direct
appeal was allowed from an order dismissing an impleaded
party, but in none of which was the point raised that the
appeal was premature. The Court stated that though these
cases did not decide the point, yet they felt that they could
not assume that all of the judges overlooked it, or were
ignorant of it, and that before hearing the appeals, they
must have determined that they were appealable. 6
In holding the particular discretionary order in the
instant case appealable, the Court of Appeals thus chose a
course contrary to the only Federal decision directly on
the point under the related Federal Rule, and the Court
failed to refer to the many cases in which discretionary
rulings of the lower court were held not to be final orders
and hence not directly appealable. In Cornell v. McCann,"
the Court had said that the opinion of a judge is not in any
sense the final act, however positive, so as to be the subject
of appeal, as it may always be altered or changed before
final decree.
In the present case, though the order in question was
one dismissing a person already impleaded, the Court of
- 154 F. 2d 545 (4th Cir., 1946).
"Baltimore Transit Co. v. State to use of Schriefer, 183 Md. 674, 39 A. 2d
858 (1944); Standard Wholesale Phosphate and Acid, Works v. Rukert
Terminals Corp., 65 A. 2d 304 (Md. 1949).
8General Taxicab Ass'n. v. O'Shea, 109 F. 2d 671 (D. C. 1940); Sheppard
v. Atlantic States Gas Co., 167 F. 2d 841 (3rd Cir., 1948) ; Brown v. Cranston,
132 F. 2d 631 (2nd Cir., 1942); City of Philadelphia v. National Surety
°Corp., 140 F. 2d 805 (3rd Cir., 1944).
"This statement by the Court of Appeals is referred to in 16 A. L. R. 2d
at p. 1027 in footnote 8 to the annotation's statement that:
"Cases in which appeals from orders denying or granting motions for
the joinder of additional parties were heard without objection as to
their appealability are no authority upon the issue of appealability,
because they may be explained by the fact that the issue of appealability
was never raised or called to the attention of the court."
"48 Md. 592.
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Appeals considered it the same as the denial of a motion
to implead in the first instance, and its holding was worded
in terms of the latter. It would seem that the Court was
correct in making no distinction here, for in either case,
the effect on the parties is the same25 The Court did how-
ever make a distinction between the granting and denying
of the motion to implead. It said:
"A situation where a third party is impleaded differs
materially from one where an application to implead
is denied. Where a third party is impleaded, he is in
no worse situation than if he had been originally sued.
Nothing final has been decided against him. He still
has the opportunity to try his case, and if it goes against
him, he can then appeal. No rights of the original
plaintiff have been interfered with, because the result
is only that he has another defendant in the case,
against whom he may recover ... On the other hand,
where the trial court declines to implead a third party,
the defendant's right to proceed against that third
party, in that proceeding, has been finally determined,
and he should have the right to have that question
settled by the appellate court before he is forced to
submit to trial without such third party in the case. We
think, where impleading is denied, the spirit and the
intention of the rule are best served by immediate
appeals. It is our conclusion, therefore, that the orders
herein are final, and that the appeals are not premature,
but can and should be heard at this time" 9
Thus, the Court of Appeals is here holding that the
granting of a motion to implead is not final and hence not
appealable, whereas the denying of the motion is final and
appealable. In a recent annotation in A.L.R.,,4 ° it was
81 In the Minnesota case cited, supra, n. 14, it was argued to the court that
though denials of motions to join additional parties were not appealable,
yet the denial of a motion to vacate such an order was appealable and
several Minnesota cases to this effect were cited. However, the court in this
case expressly overruled these former decisions. It quoted the general rule
that:
"'A non-appealable order cannot be carried to the supreme court for
review on the merits by means of an appeal from an order granting or
refusing a motion to vacate such an order. That which cannot be done
directly cannot be done indirectly'."
The court then went on to hold that:
" ..The rule of non-appealability applies to orders which deny or
grant motions for the vacation of an order either denying or granting
the joinder of additional parties to an action."
Supra, n. 24.
40 Appealability of Order With Respect to Motion for Joinder of Additional
Parties, 16 A. L. R. 2d 1023 (1951).
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pointed out that Maryland and Pennsylvania stand alone
in making this distinction. In the absence of a statute
making the order appealable, and in the absence of a par-
ticular fact situation by virtue of which the order does
affect a substantial right of the appellant, or works an
irreparable injury, the annotation points out that all the
other states which have ruled on the matter adhere to the
general rule that ".. . an order requiring, or permitting,
or refusing to permit, the joinder of additional parties is
not appealable, since it is interlocutory and not final in
nature".4' Query, whether there is any basis in law for
the distinction made by the Maryland and Pennsylvania
Courts?
On the face of it, it indeed seems strange to have a
discretionary matter in which, if the judge rules one way,
the complaining party may appeal, whereas, if he rules the
other way, the complaining party cannot appeal. The Court
recognized that nothing final would have been decided
against the appellees had the motion to implead been
allowed to stand. Where, however, has anything final been
decided against the appellants in dismissing the motion?
The order in question did not deny the appellants the
means of further prosecuting or defending their suits for
it was expressly granted without prejudice and therefore
did not bar them from later suing the City and Corporation
in a separate proceeding. It in no way affected the defen-
dant's defense in their suit with the homeowners. The
order determined nothing concerning the liability of the
appellees to the appellants. The Court of Appeals said
that the defendant's right to proceed against the third party
in that proceeding had been finally determined. However,
the Maryland Third-Party Practice Rule gives him no such
right. As pointed out above, it leaves the granting or denial
of a motion to implead to the discretion of the trial court.42
The order striking the impleading order was merely
procedural. It determined that as a matter of trial conveni-
ence, the appellants should not bring the appellees into
their suit with the homeowners. Professor Moore in his
noted work on Federal Practice says:
"It is important at the outset to note that third-
party practice, and particularly the practice provided
for in Rule 14, is procedural. Rule 14 does not 'abridge,
enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any
- Ibid, 1028.
" Supra, n. 8.
[VOL. XII
1951] NORTHWESTERN NAT. INS. CO. v. ROSOFF 155
litigant.' It creates no substantive rights ... The Rule
does not establish a right of reimbursement, indemnity,
nor contribution; but where there is basis for such
right, Rule 14 expedites the presentation, and in some
cases accelerates the accrual, of such right".43
Again the same author states:
"An original party may, but is not obliged to move
to implead a third party, and his failure to do so, or
the court's refusal to permit him to do so, affects none
of his substantive rights."
Though Professor Moore is speaking with regard to
Federal Rule 14, it must be kept in mind that the Maryland
Third-Party Practice Rule is similar to and is based on the
Federal Rule. On the point in question in the instant case,
Professor Moore says, "Where the defendant's motion to
implead a third party is denied, the order would not be
appealable, inasmuch as it does not finally dispose of any
rights of the defendant".45 (Emphasis supplied.)
Since the present case was decided there have been two
Federal cases directly on the point at issue. Both of these
held that an order dismissing an impleaded party was not
a final order and hence not immediately appealable. In
County Bank, Greenwood, S. C. v. First National Bank of
Atlanta,47 the third-party defendant moved to dismiss the
third-party complaint which had been entered against it.
The motion having been granted, the third-party plaintiff
appealed and the court said:
"We find it unnecessary to discuss the question
raised by the instant appeal, for we think the appeal
is premature and must be dismissed. The decision of
the District Court is in no sense a final judgment, since
it does not settle the issues in this case".48
Thus we find that every case which has determined the
point under the related Federal Rule has reached a con-
clusion contra to the Maryland Court of Appeals. The
Maryland Court, however, did cite the Pennsylvania case
0 3 MooaE, FEDyA. P&cTC (2nd ed., 1948), Sec. 14.03, p. 409.
" Ibid, Sec. 14.06, p. 416.
0 Ibid, Sec. 14.19, p. 450.
County Bank, Greenwood, S. C. v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 184
F. 2d 152 (4th Cir., 195) ; Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Jones Construc-




of Cummings v. A. F. Rees, Inc.,19 referred to in the A.L.R.
annotation discussed above, which held that the quashing
of a writ of scire facias (used to implead a defendant) was
immediately appealable, whereas allowing the impleading
would not have been appealable. The Court pointed out
that Pennsylvania has been a pioneer among the states in
third party practice and therefore its decisions are entitled
to added consideration. However, it should be observed
that under the Pennsylvania Rule a defendant may implead
another defendant "as of course", 0 and therefore in Penn-
sylvania the dismissal of the impleaded party would seem
to finally settle a right of one of the parties and for that
reason would be appealable. Hence, the analogy of that
case is of doubtful validity in Maryland where impleading
is discretionary.
Thus, it would seem that the Court of Appeals would
have been more in accord with its past holdings as to non-
appealability of discretionary orders, with the federal inter-
pretation of the related Federal Rule 14, and with the
general rule elsewhere, had it here held that the lower
Court's discretionary denial of defendant's attempt to
implead the appellees, (no rights having been settled by
such order) was not a final order and no appeal could be
taken until final judgment.
In ruling to the contrary the Court of Appeals said:
"It seems to us in the nature of things that to decline
to hear an appeal from an order dismissing third-party
complaints, thereby requiring the original defendant
to try his case without having the third-party in it,
and then, on a second appeal to have a judgment
against the original defendant reversed on the ground
that the third-party defendant should have been in,
would make somewhat of a mockery of the rule which
is designed to have all parties in one action if they can
be properly brought before the court, and to prevent
a multiplicity of suits".-'
What the Court feared here, however, could only occur
where there has been an abuse of discretion, for only where
" 126 Pa. Super. 117, 190 A. 416 (Pa. 1937).
0Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes (1936), Tit. 12, par. 141:
"Any defendant, named in any action, may sue out, as of course, a
writ of scire facias to bring upon the record, as an additional defendant,
any other person alleged to be alone liable or liable over to him for the
cause of action declared on, or jointly or severally liable therefor with
him, with the same force and effect as if such other had been originally
sued." (Italics supplied.)
Supra, n. 24, 465.
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there is such an abuse could the case be reversed on appeal
for not having the third party in it. The Court itself
recognized this when, in deciding whether or not there had
been an abuse, it said:
"Questions of this nature are much better decided
by the trial judges than by appellate courts, and the
decisions of such judges should only be disturbed
where it is apparent that some serious error or abuse
of discretion or autocratic action has occurred. There
is nothing in the cases before us which shows any of
these considerations to be present in the slightest
degree, and we will, therefore, affirm the orders of the
lower court".52
Only on infrequent occasions has the Court of Appeals
held that the lower court abused its discretion. Something
that occurs so rarely should not be made sufficient reason
for a holding that is contrary to the related holdings of the
federal courts as well as the majority of state courts and
seemingly contrary to the policy of other Maryland cases.
A factor in the present case, which might explain its
result, is that there were more than forty similar cases in
which homeowners were suing their insurance companies
to collect for explosion damage caused by the City and the
Rosoff Corporation, and in all of these, the lower court
had refused the defendant's motion to implead. These cases
were awaiting the result of this appeal, and any delay in
this case would have resulted in a delay to all forty. Hence,
if the Court had dismissed the appeal as premature with-
out deciding the question whether or not the City and
Corporation should have been impleaded, then all forty
cases would have been left in doubt. If the Court later had
determined, on appeal from a final judgment, that there
had been an abuse in not allowing the impleading, then it
would have meant a retrial of not one but forty cases. To
avoid this undesirable result, therefore, might well have
been the real reason behind the Court's decision that the
striking of the impleading order was directly appealable.
Assuming that such was the case, in light of the fact
that every case on the point, found by the writer, is contra
to the Maryland view, except the above referred to Penn-
sylvania case, if the issue should again be presented to the
Court of Appeals in a normal case without the pressing
need for haste, it seems fair to speculate, whether the Court
- Ibid, 467.
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would then adhere to stare decisis and follow its present
holding, or whether it might not then overrule the instant
case and line Maryland up with the Federal and other State
Courts decisions by holding that the dismissal of a third-
party complaint is not a final order and hence not directly
appealable? Or, in light of the fact that under the circum-
stances of the instant case, the dismissal of the third-party
complaint really had only a practical as distinguished from
a legal finality, it might be desirable for the Court of
Appeals to exercise its rule making power and remove the
conflict between the Maryland and Federal cases.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF ORAL CONTRACT TO
DEVISE REAL PROPERTY - RENDITION
OF PERSONAL SERVICES AS
PART PERFORMANCE
Shives v. Borgman
A bill was brought for specific performance of an alleged
oral contract to convey real and personal property. Plaintiff
was the former housekeeper of the decedent, while the
defendant was his administrator and heir at law. Plaintiff
claimed that from 1931 until 1936 she, with her son, lived
at the home of the decedent, keeping house for him, and
performing services for which she received compensation;
that she then left the employment of the decedent; that in
1946 she and her husband visited decedent, at his request,
and that in the course of the conversation decedent prom-
ised plaintiff that if she would return and care for him until
his death, he would leave her all his property, real and
personal; that plaintiff accepted this offer and with her
husband and son did return and care for the decedent until
his death, without receiving any compensation whatever.
Decedent died intestate a year and four months after the
plaintiff had resumed her employment with him.
The lower court held that the plaintiff and decedent,
"entered into a valid and enforceable contract by which
the decedent agreed to will his entire estate to complain-
ant", and as such the administrator was ordered to dis-
tribute the personal estate to her and a trustee was
appointed to convey the real estate to her.
169 A. 2d 802 (Md. 1949).
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